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A Model for
Managing DecisionMaking Information
in the GIG-Enabled
Battlespace
Maj SaMuel D. BaSS, uSaF
Maj RuSty O. BalDwin, PhD, uSaF, RetiReD
Editorial Abstract: The Defense Department
is transforming information-technology
systems into a Global Information Grid
(GIG) that will connect sensors to weap
ons systems and provide unprecedented
situational awareness. The authors sug
gest that if not properly implemented, the
GIG may overwhelm war fighters with
information presented at the wrong time,
at the wrong level of detail, and without
proper analysis. This article proposes a
model to direct the flow of information in
the GIG.

T

he DeparTmenT of Defense (DOD)
is in the midst of transforming its vast
collection of information-technology
systems into an interconnected Global
Information Grid (GIG), which will ultimately
connect sensors to weapons systems, enable
personnel to share information at will, and
provide unprecedented levels of situational
awareness to commanders at all levels. how
ever, if we do not implement the GIG with a
proper level of restriction on the flow of infor
mation, war fighters risk being overwhelmed
not only by too much information but also by
information presented at the wrong time, at
the wrong level of detail, and without proper

analysis and interpretation. This article pro
poses a model to prevent this situation by di
recting the flow of information based on its
classification level, integrity, and relevance to
the end user.

The Global Information Grid
In response to increasing difficulties associ
ated with sharing information between vari
ous platforms and information systems operat
ing in the joint environment, the DOD created
the concept of the GIG.1 DOD policy defines
this grid as “a globally interconnected, end-to
end set of information capabilities, associated
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processes, and personnel for collecting, pro
cessing, storing, disseminating and managing
information on demand to warfighters, policy
makers, and support personnel.”2 established
GIG policies also implement key components
of the Clinger-Cohen Information Technology
management reform act of 1996, including
information security, revised acquisition strate
gies, and best practices for handling data at all
levels of the DOD.3 although many of the ef
forts in developing the GIG might simply en
tail the application of the DOD’s best practices
in acquisitions to the still-maturing field of in
formation technology, the goal of achieving
information superiority remains paramount—
the primary objective of the overall GIG effort.
Connecting personnel and equipment with
advanced information-sharing tools will likely
revolutionize our capabilities, but we must
carefully manage the quality and volume of
information presented to the war fighters of
tomorrow.

The Sand Table
For centuries, military commanders have
used various models to understand the battlespace. In the seventeenth century, campaign
planners used intricate, craftsmen-built scale
models of fortifications to analyze points of
vulnerability and routes of attack.4 In the field,
leaders have long used sticks and stones in the
sand to rehearse maneuvers and depict unit
locations and terrain. aircraft and antiaircraft
technology increased the complexity of the
“sand table” by adding important air compo
nents to the planning process. new technology
used in Operation Desert Storm provided
commanders and bomb-damage analysts a live
view from the cockpit and, in many cases, from
the weapons themselves as they flew into tar
gets. Today, command centers of all levels are
equipped with large data walls, on which in
teresting computer or video feeds provide a
constant flow of data. Live video from re
motely piloted predator aircraft feeds into air
and space operations centers, giving com
manders and intelligence analysts what some
people call “predator Crack” or “Kill TV” be
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cause of the display’s ability to divert viewers’
full attention away from their primary duties.5
The frequently asked question concerning
what shows on the displays and who has re
sponsibility for the content raises an even
broader and more important question about
the future GIG-enabled command center: how
will we manage all of the data available on all
of the interconnected platforms?
although the GIG’s influence on the devel
opment and acquisition of weapons systems is
evident in requirements for common data
standards and supported communications pro
tocols, the military services are actively devel
oping ways to inject network technology every
where. army projects such as Future Force
Warrior will provide each soldier with a com
plex array of networked information sensors
and displays, reminiscent of the gear worn by
the futuristic space marines in the sciencefiction movie Aliens.6 One scene in that movie
depicts a frighteningly realistic scenario in
which the team commander watches health
monitors go silent as each member falls and
the confusion of battle grinds his decisionmaking ability to a halt. Several years later,
real commanders orbiting in Black hawk heli
copters over Somalia tried to command a res
cue convoy through a decaying urban environ
ment. The communications delay between the
airborne command post and the trucks intro
duced chaos significant enough to confuse the
convoy, effectively driving it into a dead end.7
Future systems must be able to create a timely
flow of critical information in both directions,
and we need to establish processes to help us
manage and respond to that flow effectively.
Because of the rapidly increasing volume of
available information, numerous research proj
ects now under way seek to design virtual envi
ronments that integrate, analyze, and display
every piece of information in an immersive,
four-dimensional battlespace, where mission
planners and commanders can manipulate
time and perspective to suit their needs.8 One
can easily imagine the demands placed on
commanders trying to conduct a war from in
side a virtual, real-time sand table with data
from thousands of sources pouring in at in
credible rates. additionally, the GIG notion
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ally gives personnel anywhere in the battlespace the ability to have similar representations
streamed to their locations by various means.
an obvious hazard of this capability—beyond
information overload—is the danger of com
manders making tactical decisions based on
data intended for a strategic perspective and
war fighters on the ground adjusting their tac
tics based on information intended only for
strategic planners.

The Problem of Inverted
Perspectives
as prescribed in joint doctrine, planners
design operations to follow the principles of
war, which include surprise, simplicity, security,
and unity of command.9 numerous historical
examples illustrate how friendly or hostile knowl
edge of certain components of plans drasti
cally altered the results of those plans. Still
others demonstrate that reaction or failure to
respond to evolving circumstances has a dras
tic impact on the operation and effectiveness
of the leadership involved. rather than ex
plore the success and failure of operations
with respect to the principles of war, we should
consider the implications of operating a GIGenhanced command center of the future.
For example, a suite of sensors programmed
to detect personnel and vehicle movement
could collect and report status for display on a
command center’s data wall, indicating ma
neuver by an unknown unit. If we can attribute
this maneuver to a friendly special-operations
mission planned and executed in secrecy, we
should restrict access to this sensor data at the
same classification level of the mission and
not automatically display it on a data wall for
viewing by personnel without an appropriate
clearance. Conversely, if a similar sensor suite
detected the footsteps of an individual in a re
stricted area, we should present the data col
lected by this sensor (probably not displayed
on the same data wall) only to appropriate se
curity personnel. Commanders directing their
attention to an unprocessed data point like
this could experience an inverted perspective,
whereby a single piece of potentially irrelevant
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data diverts focus from the broader picture.
Similar scenarios could illustrate how a tactical
unit on the ground might see data intended
only for a strategic view; any changes to the
actions of that tactical unit might eliminate a
key component of a strategic plan. We assert
that such an inverted perspective constitutes a
very real hazard of information that might ex
ist in a GIG-enhanced battlefield.
In an ideal environment, we would deploy
thousands if not millions of sensors across the
battlespace to collect climate, audio, video,
and electromagnetic signal data. additionally,
airborne command and control (C2) assets
would compose an integrated picture of the
battlespace. Current processes and tools such
as air tasking orders help deconflict the air
space, but some operations conducted on the
ground or at sea might not be coordinated
with all components. a robust sensor net would
provide a bridge between these dissimilar
components of the battlespace to help pre
vent incidents of friendly fire, but the compos
ite picture would likely not have relevance to
some war fighters. In total, the amount of in
formation collected will be immense, and the
details of the battlespace available for display
will prove tempting to war fighters and leaders
at all levels. GIG-enhanced aircraft will have
access to a vast store of information. however,
with this comes the possibility that unprocessed
sensor data might make its way into the cock
pit, forcing pilots with increased sensitivity to
collateral damage and escalation to change
tactics, select alternate targets, or abort the
engagement.
Ground units would need time to analyze
the data from sensors detecting a nearby firefight before determining the location of units
in the area and perhaps requesting additional
airborne or spaceborne surveillance. Those
units not aware of friendly forces in covert op
erations could alter their tactics or maneuver
in response to indications of a nearby firefight—particularly if sensors indicated activity
in a unit’s area of responsibility. hopefully, all
parties in that area would have already re
ceived briefings on operations to an appropri
ate level of detail, but any GIG-enhanced ca
pabilities for examining additional sensor data
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could affect the commander on the ground in
a number of ways—hence the need for clear
rules for using this data in order to avoid in
verted perspectives.
One could present any number of examples
demonstrating avoidance of inverted perspec
tives by limiting exposure of data in the GIG,
and still more examples could illustrate that
any restrictions on information flow could re
duce flexibility. Considering both sides of this
argument, we assert that we should place lim
its on the places that automatically receive data
as well as on the people authorized to access
it. We must also consider that some plat
forms—as William T. hobbins, a lieutenant
general at the time, indicated during an inter
view with Airman Magazine—will produce data
at different rates while operators in varying
roles will consume data feeds at different rates,
thus adding more considerations for a poten
tial solution.10 Clearly, this paints an amazingly
complex picture with fuzzy and continuously
evolving operational requirements.

Current Management of
Information Flow
We are all familiar with the classification
levels defined by the national Security agency.
Only users holding a secret or higher clear
ance and having a need to know can read data
protected by a secret classification level. Simi
larly, readers with a high classification level
can normally read any material at or below
that level, assuming they have a need to know.
In a conceptual, GIG-enabled virtual com
mand center, we could classify information
specific to a sensitive operation at a sufficiently
high level to prevent those who hold lowerlevel classifications from reading the data.
Furthermore, we could reserve display of data
relevant to those classified operations for indi
viduals with the required need to know. addi
tionally, we must assure that data on a com
mand center’s displays remains at the lowest
clearance level of personnel with access to
those displays.
Using a well-disciplined approach, we could
properly secure or sanitize data from all
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sources to prevent users from seeing informa
tion not cleared for their consumption. Thus
far, however, we have addressed only the
proper treatment of data with respect to con
fidentiality. The integrity or trustworthiness of
the data is also of prime importance, particu
larly in urban areas, where we have a great
need for very accurate and timely data and,
therefore, a need to evaluate raw data rapidly
and prepare it for presentation to leadership.
normal data-classification techniques do not
classify information based on its integrity, so we
need to explore a method to help categorize
data that could cause an inverted-perspective
hazard in a GIG-enhanced picture of the
battlefield, whether it is unprocessed remotesensor data or imagery not yet evaluated by
intelligence personnel.

Biba’s Integrity Model
While working on an air Force computersecurity research project in 1977, K. J. Biba
wrote what has since become the seminal pa
per on information integrity.11 In it, he exam
ined a method for maintaining the validity of
data on information-processing systems, choos
ing to use the concept of integrity as a measure
of information’s validity. That is, information
from a known, trustworthy source would have
high integrity, while information based on ru
mor or from unknown sources would have low
integrity. Similarly, password-protected infor
mation stored in electronic form would have
higher integrity than data available for read
ing or editing without any access controls at
all. If we extrapolated this concept for applica
tion to our GIG-enhanced command center,
the integrity of the reader—that is, the read
er’s response to data—is influenced by the in
formation consumed. new and startling infor
mation will affect the reader’s behavior to
varying degrees, based on the integrity of the
source of that data. For example, a commander
might decide to take some risks after reading
information from a reliable source but not do
so in reaction to the same information from
an unreliable source. Similarly, one should not
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interpret a report that included a data point
from a low-integrity source as factual.
In the strict formulation of Biba’s integrity
model, three rules apply to reading, writing,
or acting upon information from sources of
various integrity levels. This model refers to
things that can create and consume data as
subjects and to products produced as objects.
The rules rely on the notion of dominance,
which implies some sort of permission granted
to the dominant over the subordinate, whether
that permission involves reading, accessing, or
in some way modifying something. Using se
curity clearances to demonstrate dominance,
Biba shows that one object dominates another
when its security clearance level is the same as
or higher than that of the other object. For
example, a secret clearance dominates secret
or unclassified clearances, while top secret
dominates top secret, secret, and unclassified
clearance levels. When a subject dominates an
object, the subject can read the object. If the
subject does not dominate the object, the sub
ject cannot read the object, just as someone
with a secret clearance cannot read a top-secret
document but can read secret or unclassified
documents. Biba uses the concept of integrity
and the rule of dominance to determine ac
cess controls in his computer-security re
search. The three integrity-preserving rules
from Biba’s integrity model are as follows:
1. a subject can read an object if and only if
the object’s integrity level dominates (is
greater than or equal to) the subject’s in
tegrity level. That is, a subject can only
read objects with equal or higher integrity.
2. a subject can write data into an object if
and only if the subject’s integrity level
dominates the object’s integrity level.
Since the subject must have integrity at
least as high as the object, the object’s
integrity is preserved.
3. a subject can execute (or direct the ac
tion of) another subject if and only if
the first subject’s integrity level domi
nates the second subject’s integrity level.
Someone of lower integrity cannot oper
ate on someone else’s behalf.12
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In plain terms, rule one means that a sub
ject can read an object only if the data will not
have a deceptive or misleading effect on the
reader. In our command center, we would not
normally present data (an object) to the com
mander (a subject) unless the data had under
gone proper vetting using prudent processes.
rule two means that some data source of a
lower integrity level can’t inject information
that one might interpret as accurate or valid.
again using our command center example,
we would not display raw data on the data wall
until we have validated it, much like we would
not present the actions of a unit to the com
mander as confirmed results until we have
conducted proper battle damage assessment
or a mission debriefing. rule three would pre
vent unnecessary reaction to deceptive acts or
preprocessed data from sensors, which could
prove useful in avoiding inverted perspectives.
Together, these rules address some of the
concerns we have explored so far with respect
to unprocessed sensor data. Therefore, it seems
reasonable that application of the Biba integ
rity model to a notional command center can
form the basis of a system implemented to help
prevent inverted perspectives. This model
could assist in defining specific requirements
for automatically filtering information and
controlling access, but commander flexibility
and the ability to share information would ex
perience necessary limitations to some de
gree. Joint doctrine emphasizes information
dissemination as a key component of intelli
gence support: “Intelligence will play a critical
and continuous role in supporting warfight
ing. advances in computer processing, precise
global positioning, and telecommunications
will provide joint force commanders . . . with
the capability to determine accurate locations
of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to col
lect, process, and disseminate relevant data to
thousands of locations.”13
a key point entails the use of the word rele
vant to describe the dissemination of data.
Further discussion in doctrine defines this term
as a key attribute of intelligence that describes
the scope of intelligence gathering and sharing
efforts; moreover, it delineates who needs spe
cific pieces of information and, more impor
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tantly, who shouldn’t be distracted by irrele
vant data.14 Therefore, a model that combines
the DOD’s traditional classification levels with
data integrity and relevance holds the key to
formulating policy for data-sharing mechanisms
developed for future command centers.

Classification, Integrity,
and Relevance
The war fighter’s need for relevant and ac
curate information is thoroughly understood
and well defined in doctrine and operational
art, but defining the scope, sources, and for
mat of the data would require continuously
updating vast amounts of information. efforts
to build systems that provide data in predefined
formats or follow predefined message-sharing
rules normally result in products difficult to
integrate or expensive to update. To avoid the
problems of updating systems to keep pace
with continually evolving technologies, we pro
pose to control information flow using a datasharing mechanism based on classification,
integrity, and relevance. The following sum
marizes our definitions so far:
• classification: a rating assigned to infor
mation in order to provide appropriate
protection and restrict access
• integrity : a measure of a subject’s or ob
ject’s trustworthiness
• relevance : a measure of applicability to a
purpose or a customer
• dominance : the condition in effect when
one entity has the same or higher rating
as another
Our information-sharing mechanism must
enable meaningful and adaptive informationsharing capabilities within a command center.
Consider such a center staffed with personnel
of varying clearances and areas of functional
expertise, similar to other command centers
such as wing command posts, expeditionary
operations centers, or air and space operations
centers. as in Biba’s model, both personnel
and systems can create and consume data and
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are referred to as subjects, while the docu
ments or virtual products produced are re
ferred to as objects. Our information-sharing
mechanism assigns three ratings to every sub
ject and object: classification, relevance, and
integrity.
Suppose the classification levels for subjects
and objects are unclassified, for official use only,
secret, or top secret. For simplicity’s sake, our
model will not address clearance caveats or
clearances for personnel from other countries,
but we could readily incorporate them. The
relevance and integrity levels of subjects and
objects will be low, medium, or high. personnel
classification levels normally do not change over
time, but personnel can induce and experi
ence changes in integrity levels and will pro
duce objects of varying relevance levels. Simi
larly, documents and processing systems often
have the same ratings as their content or inputs.
For our command center, we propose the fol
lowing rules, which govern all informationsharing transactions and which we enumerate
below prior to discussing their implications in
the next section:
1. a subject can read or process an object
if and only if the subject’s classification
level dominates the object’s classifica
tion level.
2. Initially, all trusted subjects have a high
integrity rating, and all subjects and ob
jects are assigned appropriate classifica
tion ratings. all untrusted subjects have
a low integrity rating.
3. The integrity level of a subject or object can
be raised only through a well-controlled
process.
4. When a subject creates an object, the
created object will have an integrity level
equal to the subject that created it, or if
the newly created object contains infor
mation from other subjects or objects,
in full or in part, the new object will have
the lowest integrity level of the compo
nent information.
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5. The relevance level of a subject or object
is determined through another wellcontrolled process.
6. If a subject reads an object of a lower in
tegrity level, the subject’s integrity level
will take on the object’s lower integrity
level. The subject can return to its previ
ous integrity level only in accordance
with the process defined in rule three.
7. a subject can process and then manually
or automatically forward an object to an
other subject only if the forwarded ob
ject dominates the receiving subject’s
integrity and relevance levels and if the
receiving subject’s classification level
dominates the object’s classification.15

Rule Analysis and Clarification
rule one ensures observation of the funda
mental requirements of need to know, secu
rity, and proper access-control mechanisms.
rule two ensures that personnel and
information-processing systems can share in
formation following our basic rules. Trusted
subjects include sources trusted in a wide con
text, whether that involves coalition partners;
our own personnel- and information-processing
systems and equipment; and intelligence, sur
veillance, and reconnaissance resources. Un
trusted subjects include those systems and
personnel not under the command center’s
control, possibly including subjects such as
the domestic and international media, infor
mants, or any source of questionable origin.
rule three dictates establishment of a for
mal process to change the integrity level of a
subject or object. The intelligence community
uses similar procedures to mark the level of
trust in an intelligence resource; multiple
sources of lower integrity levels could provide
enough corroboration to support raising the
integrity level of a subject or object, but the
process of doing so should be well understood
and performed by a designated entity. This
process will obviously represent one of the
most important components of this model
since improperly raising integrity levels of a
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poor information source could compromise
the entire scheme.
rule four requires that personnel or sys
tems creating information attribute the source
accordingly and properly mark data at the ap
propriate integrity level. Doing so will ensure
that a receiver places the suitable level of trust
or skepticism on the information. new infor
mation compiled from multiple sources will
not automatically assume the integrity level of
the subject compiling the information; in
stead, the integrity level of the new object will
reflect the lowest such level of the compiled
information until application of the process
defined in rule three.
The process suggested by rule five can be
more flexible than that in rule three, depend
ing on the role of the receiving subject. For
example, a tactical ground unit would have a
much smaller “sphere of relevance” than
would a C2 aircraft orbiting over an area of
responsibility. The ground unit would typi
cally be interested in information about an
opponent’s nearby ground forces, in-range ar
tillery units, or status of aircraft flying close air
support, but not in mission tracks of longrange friendly aircraft, threats from enemy air
defenses, or air-refueling tracks. however, the
C2 aircraft might want to display locations of
friendly ground forces in the area of a specific
operation. Some process must define an ap
propriate sphere of relevance for each subject,
based on mission needs. at the operational
level, each subject should also be able to cus
tomize its sphere of relevance to assure the ad
dition of data of interest or the removal of in
formation deemed no longer pertinent.
rule six prohibits the forwarding of any
low-integrity information as higher-integrity
information without proper analysis and con
sideration. Similarly, personnel who read lowintegrity information must be careful not to
make decisions or pass on the information
without putting it into proper context. This
particular rule is more difficult to implement
for personnel than for data-processing equip
ment. For example, one could interpret a sys
tem’s report of erratic and illogical readings
from a sensor as a malfunction; additionally,
one could include the appropriate caveats
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with low-integrity data added to a report. how
ever, when the subject is a person rather than
an automated system, preventing him or her
from acting on or up-channeling information
without regard for its lower integrity will pres
ent a problem.
rule seven ensures the proper filtering of
information in accordance with integrity and
relevance rules. a tactical display is useless if it
exhibits irrelevant or misleading information
at the wrong time, and unprocessed or incom
plete data could cause premature or incorrect
decisions. The final caveat guarantees that
sensitive operations are not compromised—
data must undergo sanitizing or proper de
classification before transmission to subjects
not involved in the operation. In effect, this
rule provides the “push and pull”—prevent
ing information overload from unneeded au
tomated pushes while preserving flexibility
for pulling useful data.

Back in the Command Center
In order to implement these rules in a com
mand center, we need to completely automate
some processes, let personnel in various ca
reer fields or leadership positions handle the
others exclusively, and see that both systems
and personnel implement several rules. after
the transfer of objects to paper form, tradi
tional processes such as classification controls
and need-to-know restrictions become person
nel responsibilities, while various mechanisms
can restrict the flow of digital information.
rules three and five, however, require humans
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to interpret data and make changes to integrity
and relevance levels, based on that interpreta
tion. Intelligence and operations personnel
will normally be in the best position to change
these levels, depending on the specifics of the
situation. In order to enforce both rules, per
sonnel must have a good understanding of the
processes and must properly restrict mechanisms
that effect changes to integrity and relevance.

Conclusion
Clearly, we operate in a politically complex
environment, and many operations occur in
the focal point of a 24-hour news cycle. missed
opportunities to engage high-value targets
and incidents of collateral damage have equal
probability of becoming headlines; both can
raise questions about our military effective
ness. as a result, a commander’s appetite for
information will continue to grow, as will de
mands that future systems be interconnected
via the GIG. Our efficiency and ability to rap
idly fuse, analyze, and convert raw data into
actionable intelligence will depend on the ca
pabilities of future systems and the processes
that govern their implementation. We believe
that the classification, integrity, and relevance
rules described above will help guide the
development of systems for maximizing
data fusion and avoid the pitfalls of condi
tions such as inverted perspectives. Because
of the benefits associated with these rules,
we need to utilize a simulated command
center and information-processing systems
to develop them significantly. • 
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